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ABSTRACT
The imbalance of bargaining power between the state and the
transnational corporations is re-examined in the context of
the recent negotiations between Mexico and IBM. In 1984-
1985., IBM negotiated with Mexico to establish a
microcomputer manufacturing facility in Mexico; Mexico's
Foreign Investment Commission initially rejected IBM's
investment proposal, but reversed their decision after IBM
promised a considerably larger investment package.
The case illustrates how a developing country is able
to enhance its bargaining position vis-a-vis the TNC by
exploiting sources of bargaining power. Four sources of
bargaining power are examined--the relationship of the
parties, knowledge and information, the role of competition,
and the institutional arrangements for negotiating with
foreign investors.
The case suggests that the relationship of the parties is a
fundamental source of bargaining strength, but its influence
can vary to the extent that the firm is already established
in the country, whether the firm will produce for export or
the local market, and to the extent that the state has
targetted the industry as a priority. The role of knowledge
and information is also fundamental--it allows the state to
offset the uncertainty of the investment and raise relevant
issues that might otherwise be overlooked.
The role of competition, often noted as a source of
bargaining power, is relevant, but difficult to take
advantage of. The state must enhance its competitive
position as well as find ways to induce competition among
firms. Finally, the author advocates coordination of the
state's negotiating and decision-making institutions, but
there may be political and case-specific constraints to a
coordinated strategy. A new model for organizing industrial
development policy-making is suggested.
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INTRODUCTION
"The position in foreign direct
investment today is something of a
standoff, such as frequently occurs
in bilateral monopoly. Both
parties would benefit from getting
together and working out mutually
advantageous arrangements."
-- Charles Kindleberger
Economic Developent, 1958
Kindleberger's 1958 comment on the position in foreign
direct investment has inspired many researchers to re-
evaluate the "standoff" between the transnational
corporation (TNC) and the developing country state.
Traditionally, the TNC has been dominant in state-TNC
interactions because of its greater flexibility and access
to resources unavailable to host countries. More recently,
an overall decline in foreign investment, particularly in
Latin America, has triggered competition among host
countries for foreign investment, potentially strengthening
the TNC's position.[1] New evidence suggests, however, that
a traditionally weak host country has learned over time to
enhance its bargaining position by exploiting various
sources of bargaining power during its negotiations with
TNCs. In this thesis, I examine four sources of bargaining
power in the context of Mexico's negotiations with IBM in
1984-1985. The four sources of bargaining power discussed
include the relationship of the parties, knowledge and
information, the role of competition, and the institutional
arrangements for negotiating.
The current scenario in foreign direct investment would
not predict that these sources of bargaining strength could
5
improve the bargaining position, and therefore, serve the
development objectives, of a developing country like Mexico.
The TNCs' traditional bargaining power and the overall drop
in total foreign investment over the last five years provide
a dim prospect for a country that relies on foreign
investment to trigger growth and industrial development.
Mexico, like many developing countries, continues to be
concerned about preserving national sovereignty and guarding
its domestic economy from the adverse effects of foreign
investment by applying strict restrictions on foreign
investment. But, deteriorating economic conditions have
forced Mexico to be more flexible during bargaining
encounters with TNCs and less restrictive with foreign
investment laws and reCulations.
Fortunately, this scenario did not hamper Mexico's
ability to improve its bargaining position and achieve its
development objectives during its negotiations with IBM. In
my view, at least four sources of bargaining power enabled
Mexico to satisfy its interests in the negotiations.
However, despite its success, Mexico took advantage of some
of these sources less effectively than it could have.
First, while IBM offered Mexico the productive capacity
to spur non-oil exports and improve its balance of payments
position, Mexico relied upon its fundamental source of
bargaining strength--a market and investment incentives
that proved to be very attractive to IBM and enhanced
Mexico's bargaining position. Mexico's bargaining position
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was further enhanced by the near-certainty of its future
relationship with IBM. This motivated the parties to build
a good working relationship and make commitments to reach
agreement.
Second, while lack of information and negotiating skill
is often cited as a determinant of a weak bargaining
position for the state, Mexico's knowledge about its own
interests, the concerns and interests of IBM, and the
characteristics of the investment projects proved to be a
source of bargaining strength. The agreement demonstrated
Mexico's ability to skillfully satisfy competing interests,
set appropriate precedents, and correct project issues that
might have weakened its position in the long run.
Third, competition among computer firms and among
developing countries is often noted as a significant source
of bargaining power in state-TNC negotiations, but it is a
slippery concept. The case demonstrates how difficult it
can be for the state to exercise this source of bargaining
strength. While Mexico benefited from the competitive
nature of the computer industry, it did not fully exploit
the opportunity to enhance its bargaining position by
failing to increase or improve its alternatives. Mexico's
perceptions of its own competitive position were also
influenced by IBM's representations that the firm's interest
was flagging.
Finally, experts recommend that one of the most
important ways to enhance the state's bargaining position
in its interactions with foreign investors is to coordinate
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institutions and organizations within the government. In
Mexico, a partially coordinated strategy is in place.
Decision-making is centralized at a high level, but
separated from the negotiating and implementing authorities.
In the case of IBM and Mexico, the split betweeen the
decision-maker and the lower-tier officials has led to an
uncertain outcome. In sum, though the case for coordination
is strong, there may be political and case-specific
constraints to implementing such a strategy.
In Part I, I examine the role of bargaining power in
state-TNC negotiations and provide a definition of
bargaining power drawn from the negotiation literature. In
addition, I discuss the four sources of bargaining power
that provide the framework for the analysis in greater
detail. Part II presents the case of Mexico's negotiations
with IBM in 1984 and 1985 over the expansion of IBM's
manufacturing facility for microcomputers. The story was
constructed based on interview material, newspaper and
journal articles, and other background source material. It
highlights the role that public exposure, competing
interests, and political tactics can play in state-TNC
negotiations. The conclusion re-examines the four sources
of bargaining strength and the extent to which Mexico was
able to exercise its potential bargaining power vis-a-vis
IBM. In an epilogue, I recommend a possible organizational
model and negotiation strategies to allow states to more
fully take advantage of sources of bargaining strength.
a
Notes to Introduction:
[1] United Nations Economic and Social Council, (February 6,
1986), pages 6, 8; United Nations Economic and Social
Council, (February 26, 1985), pages 12-16.
The 1986 report shows that since 1981, when world
foreign investment peaked at $52.2 billion, world
foreign investment has dropped in 1984 to $48.5
billion. While United States and other areas of the
world have seen more modest declines, Latin American
foreign investment has dropped more thatn 55 percent
from 1981 to 1984.
See also Dennis Encarnation and Louis T. Wells, Jr.,
(1985).
PART I: SOURCES OF BARGAINING POWER
"Give me that which I
want, and you shall have
this which I want..."
-- Adam Smith
The Wealth of Nations
Pargaining Power
The issue of bargaining power is central in all
negotiations, particularly between developing country states
and TNCs. Three propositions describe why bargaining power
is at the heart of state-TNC negotiations: (1) the TNC has
more flexibility than the state; (2) the state will continue
to rely on transnational corporations to trigger their
industrial development; (3) given the inevitability of the
relationship between the TNC and the state, the state will
attempt to exert control over the activities of the TNC.
The greater flexibility of the TNC in state-TNC
interactions puts the state at a disadvantage. A "basic
asymmetry" characterizes the relationship: the TNC has the
ability to relocate to other parts of the globe while the
state is committed to its "turf."[1 In addition, the TNC's
activities can limit options available to the state. The
oligopolistic nature of industries in which TNCs are
involved leads to market and demand distortions in host
countries. Where there are few sellers, the actions of any
one firm can have a large impact on industry output or
product price, and therefore, can bar opportunities for
local entrants and limit the options available to host
country consumers.E2] Finally, the TNC has access to a
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global pool of resources and knowledge unavailable to the
host-country. It has developed risk-minimizing strategies
that allow it to bear the costs of uncertainty more
effectively than a local (host country) firm or
government.[3]
Host countries' rely on foreign investment as a
stimulus to achieve national industrial development goals.
Despite the asymmetry, limitations, and uncertainty,
developing countries continue--with increasing frequency--to
include foreign investment components in their industrial
development plans. They are reluctant to give up the
benefits that transnational firms can provide.
Thus, a tension is created within the state between its
reliance on the TNC and its desire to exert control over TNC
activities. This tension magnifies the importance of
bargaining power and makes it imperative that states improve
their bargaining skills.
The tension created within the state is best understood
in the context of Raymond Vernon's "problem of multiple
jurisdictions." While developing countries rely on foreign
investment to contribute to a significant share of their
national output, transnational corporations have global
concerns and will not necessarily be able to single-mindedly
address the concerns of any one state.[4] Moreover,
because host countries are the links in the network of a
TNC's global operations, the economies of each state will be
influenced by the activities of the others.[5] Competition
between states for foreign investment also contributes to
11
the overlap of economic influences across states.
The problem of multiple jurisdictions, i.e., the
increasing globalization of economic interests, affects
countries and firms alike. The state wants to exert greater
control over the activities of TNCs within the state
jurisdiction, while the TNC wants as much flexibility as
possible. Nevertheless, both host country governments and
foreign investors will agree that economic and financial
considerations must often give way to political and tactical
considerations in state-TNC negotiations.[6]
Researchers often define bargaining power in state-TNC
negotiations in terms of the structures that limit or expand
bargaining power. The negotiation literature provides a
more operational definition: bargaining power is the
ability to influence the other side's perceptions and
favorably affect their decisions.[73 Since the state's
intent is to reap more of the benefits of foreign investment
by exerting control over the foreign investor,
"The degree of control that national entities can
exert over a potential foreign investor is
determined, to a large extent, by the relative
benefits that both parties 2erceive resulting from
the investment. The prospective investor's
peCceEtion of the oe22gtnities derived fromparticieatien in the local economy will influence
his attitudes towar d acceting crtain conditions
that he may normally view as Qotent ially
restrictive....Similarly, the host country may be
willing to lower its demands...to the extent that
it views the foreign investment as convenient,
necessary, or imperative to its national
development goals." (Emphasis mine.)[8
Lopsided negotiation is not inevitable. A wide margin
can exist for the state to improve its bargaining position
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vis-a-vis the TNC. Insofar as power imbalances between
states and TNCs exist, the desire among developing countries
to balance the sense of unequal power will remain strong.
By orchestrating their sources of power effectively, states
can improve their bargaining positions.E9] The following
section describes four sources of bargaining power available
to the state.
Sources of Bargai ing Egwgr
Most analyses of bargaining power begin with a simple
buyer-seller model and assume that each party has two
sources of strength--what they are willing to offer and what
they are willing to accept. These are sources of both
strength and weakness in a bargaining relationship. My
discussion begins with this fundamental understanding of the
negotiating relationship. In negotiations such as state-TNC
negotiations, the transaction between the parties does not
end after the "sale", rather the parties expect to interact
over a period of time.[10] The prospect of a future
interaction motivates the parties to build a good working
relationship during the negotiation which can be a source of
strength. In addition, by anticipating a future
relationship, the parties will make greater commitments to
reach agreement.
A second source bargaining power is the skill,
knowledge and information each party brings to the
negotiating table.[11] The adage that "knowledge is power"
rings particularly true to state-TNC negotiations. The more
knowledge the state can accumulate about its needs, those of
the negotiating parties, and the facts of the case, the
better the state can do in generating proposals that will be
hard to argue against. Knowledge of precedent and knowledge
of "facts" are both important. Skill comes into play in
identifying potential issues, raising them as negotiable
items, and bargaining wisely.
The role of competition can be an additional source of
bargaining strength. In the context of state-TNC
negotiations, competition relates to the "power of
alternatives and the "power to influence perceptions."E12)
Having an alternative to the negotiated agreement is a
source of bargaining power because it gives the state or the
TNC a "backup" in which its interests can be satisfied if an
agreement is not reached. The ability to make the other
side perceive of itself as one of many alternatives can
enhance the bargaining power of the negotiator.
Finally, the ability of a party to organize itself
effectively can provide a source of bargaining power. The
TNC is generally regarded as focused in its interests while
the state is not. The state has diverse interests and
positions to protect.[13) Yet, various coordination
arrangements can be used to overcome the weaknesses
associated with internal conflict or confrontations.
RelationshipE: Now and in the Future
In what has become a classic description of the state-
TNC negotiating relationship, Charles Kindleberger
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characterizes the bargaining over an investment project as a
bilateral monop2oly. In effect, each side possesses
resources that the other side wants. One buyer and one
seller bargain over the price of the investment. The lower
limit of the price is that for which the TNC is willing to
go abroad, and the upper limit of the price is the
opportunity cost to the state of foregoing the investment.
The price at which the parties settle lies between these and
is a function of their relative bargaining strengths.14]
Although descriptive, this one-buyer, one-seller bilateral
monopoly concept needs to be elaborated in order to identify
the party's perceived advantage and, therefore, source of
bargaining strength. This is best done by defining the
transaction in two different ways (See Figure 1a). If we
define the transaction as the sale of a TNC's productive
capacity to the host-country, then the TNC, as seller,
possesses the resources that the developing country state
wants: access to capital, technology, and export markets
along with marketing skills and experience. A review of
these resources indicates the TNC's advantage and ways in
which their increased flexibility may manifest itself in the
host country.
Traditional anaylses propose that transnational firms
have been an important source for moving international
capital. Countries have relied on foreign investment to
supply capital for industry as well as build capital markets
in the host country. Often, transnational firms do not
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necessarily bring in new capital when they invest in a
country, but appropriate local capital in order to establish
their enterprises.[15] In either case, the transnational
corporation is able to access and offer capital for
investment in ways host-country firms are not able to do.
Another resource TNCs possess is technology and
technological skills. Several negotiable issues are
associated with technology and the transfer of
technology.[16] These include: restrictive financial or
practical conditions imposed on the technology by the TNCs;
the concentration of R&D in the TNC's home country; the
appropriateness of the technology; and problems with
"dumping" of old technology on new markets.[17]
Restrictive TNC practices occur when a TNC ties the
transfer of technology to the purchase of its goods or
services, restricts subsidiaries from entering into
agreements with host countries that involve competing or
complementary technology, or reserve the technological
FIGURE 1. BILATERAL MONOPOLY
DEFINITION OF SELLER HAS Buyer wants
THE POSSESSION access
TRANSACTION OF RESOURCES to resources
(a) DEFINITION 1:
Sale of Productive i
Capacity (capital TNC state
technology, access
to markets)
(b) DEFINITION 2:
Sale of an
Investment Opp-
ortunity (Local STATE tnc
market, labor,
land, incentives)
---------------------------------------------------------
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components of the production process to its own "imported"
managers and technicians.E18) Because a TNC has greater
access to scientific manpower and financial resources to
promote innovation and new technology R&D investment tends
to be concentrated in the host country. Finally, a TNC
often uses foreign markets to produce and sell obsolete
product lines. Apple Computer, for instance, when it began
production in 1984 in Mexico was producing its 1977 model of
the Apple II. The 1977 model has survived in Mexico because
of an insulated market, but in the United States, the B-bit
Apple II cannot compete with the more powerful 16-bit
machines. [19)
A TNC also has an advantage because of its access to
export markets and its marketing skill and experience
necessary to distribute the exports. TNCs control the
markets "downstream" from the productions sites. In
addition, a TNC will have an advantage if its products
compete on the basis of product differentiation and brand
loyalty rather than price. TNCs tend to rely on marketing
strategies that emphasize superior quality, unusual
packaging, or other special features that make a product
unique and can strengthen brand loyalty among consumers.
This product differentiation strategy enables a firm to
create and maintain barriers to entry, therefore, making the
access to the industry difficult and cutting down the number
of alternative products or firms for the state to choose
from.
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In Mexico, the steroid hormone industry was dominated
by pharmaceutical TNCs.[203 (Steroid hormones are more
familiar as products such as oral contraceptives or as
cortisone products.) These firms established subsidiaries
in Mexico to process the raw materials available there and
produce intermediate steroid materials to export back to the
parent company. Marketing strategies emphasized
sophisticated product differentiation to exacerbate high
barriers to entry, and concentrate profits at the end of the
production line back in the home country, effectively
eliminating the possibility of host country firms to
compete. The effectiveness of their strategy is
demonstrated in the product prices: between 1949 and 1968,
the price of the intermediate material produced in Mexico
dropped fromm $3.00 per gram to $0.08 per gram; the parent
company's cost to produce a cortisone-derivative pill was
one and a half cents; the cost to the consumer was thirty
cents.[21
By defining the transaction as the sale of an
investment opportunity, the buyer-seller characterization of
foreign investment negotiations can be reversed (See Figure
ib). Now, the state, as seller of the investment
opportunity, possesses the resources that the TNC wants
access to, primarily labor, land, and investment incentives
such as tax breaks, and markets.
Low-cost labor has traditionally been the resource that
TNCs look for in investment opportunities abroad. Familiar
symbols of this host-country "resource" are the maquiladoras
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(assembly factories) that lined the Mexican-U. S. border.
Foreign investors were given free land, electricity, and tax
incentives--as well as low labor costs--to establish these
plants in Mexico.
The 2otential market, however, is a powerful resource
for which host countries have an strong advantage. The
perception of the size and strength of the market in host
countries encourages foreign investors to pursue investment
opportunities in those markets. For example, in 1982 after
the Mexican government decreed its new computer policy
requiring foreign firms to assemble locally, there were only
16,0()0 units installed in the country. It was reported that
up to a half of the total units had been smuggled into the
country.E22] Nonetheless, the perception of astounding
growth in the computer market led no less than forty-five
firms to submit applications for setting up assembly
operations.[23] In September 1983, the Mexican government
placed restrictions on the Mexican auto manufacturers in
order to force manufacturers to produce more efficiently by
taking advantage of economies of scale. In spite of
increased restrictions, the six firms that produce in the
industry are very hesitant to leave. Mexico remains
2otentially one of the world's largest markets.[24] Thus,
the state is also in a position to press for favorable
investment terms from the TNC.E25]
Unlike simple buyer-seller interactions in which the
end of the transaction is the end of the relationship, the
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parties in the state-TNC negotiation expect to interact over
a future period of time. Both state and TNC look for profits
as well as an arrangement with trouble-free longevity.E26]
Since the parties expect their relationship to continue, the
way in which they bargain (and their relative bargaining
strength) is likely to change.[273 The knowledge that there
might be a future relationship alters the present
negotiation.
The power of a good relationship becomes apparent
here.[283 The parties who intend to have a future
interaction will be more likely to see the value of building
a good relationship. Open communication channels and
establishing a good working relationship become more
important to the parties. Favorably affecting the other
side's decisions can result from the openness and ability to
communicate with the other party.
During the negotiations, the state and the TNC are also
more likely to make commitments to reach agreement. The
expectation of a long-term alliance necessitates decisions
that lead to agreement--the "take it or leave it" position
is less likely to be used.
Three variables can affect how much influence the
relationship of the parties has in the negotiations. First,
the state-TNC working relationship may be more influential
as a source of bargaining power when the foreign investor is
already present in the host country. In such a case, there
is near certainty that the parties will continue to have a
relationship and future encounters.
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Second, a TNC subsidiary producing for the local market
is more likely to be influenced by its relationship to the
host country than one producing for export. Parent firms in
the home country of an export-producing TNC will assume
close control over the production and distribution of
subsidiary exports, particularly those that are highly
differentiated.C29] Firms producing for the local market,
however, will have more autonomy from the parent firm, and
will be more interested in a good working relationship with
the host government.
Finally, the influence of the relationship will also
depend upon whether the state has targeted the industry as a
development priority. The state will be more interested in
building good relationships and making commitments for those
industries it sees as strategic.
A comparison of two Mexican case studies can illustrate
the influence of these variables. The steroid hormone
industry was not strategic to Mexico's development
priorities; all the TNCs had entered the market with
relatively little negotiation, if any; and the subsidiaries
all processed raw materials entirely for export back to the
parent. Gereffi writes:
"...the steroid hormone industry was
specialized (to the point of being exotic),
export-oriented, and successful. The prevailing
mood was to 'leave well enough alone' rather than
to strike a better bargain."[30]
In this case, a good working relationship was not an
active bargaining strategy, but benign neglect on the part
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of the Mexican government.
By contrast, the automobile industry was a strategic
industry, a priority for the government. The intent of the
firms, by government decree, was to produce for the local
market, and the two leading firms, Ford and GM, were already
established operations in the country at the time the
bargaining began. The working relationship and the
commitment to reach agreement was more obvious for this
case.E31)
Knowledgg ad Information: Revealing the Issues
Negotiation experts and consultants have often focused
on the accumulation of knowledge and information-sharing as
a source of bargaining strength for the state.[32) Central
to this idea is the role uncertainty plays in state-TNC
bargaining and how, as uncertainty dissipates over time, the
bargaining positions of the two parties shift. There are
two primary and contrary hypotheses that discuss how
uncertainty alters the bargaining positions of the parties
over time. Both begin with the assumption that the
"unknowns" associated with a foreign investment project are
numerous, particularly in the inital stages of investment.
One hypothesis states that foreign firms gain favorable
terms from the state when they enter the market as
compensation for taking on the risks associated with the
initial investment. However, the state's bargaining power
grows once the operation is successfully in place, other
alternatives for the state open up, and the technology
2 2
becomes stabilized. This shift of bargaining power in favor
of the state was introduced by Raymond Vernon as the
"obsolescing bargain."[33] A contrary hypothesis suggests
that a manufacturing firm may be at its weakest at the time
of the negotiations since the government controls the rules
of the game. After the investment is made, these firms have
the ability to forge alliances with the domestic
industrialists and, over time, strengthen their bargaining
power against the state. [34]
Both these hypotheses suggest that bargaining power is
dynamic--that the balance of bargaining power shifts and
changes over time. What is important for this discussion is
that the state must be aware of the possible dynamic
associated with different firm and industry conditions at
the outset of the negotiations. Gathering information and
using it effectively to offset risk and uncertainty is one
key to gaining bargaining strength. To improve its
bargaining postition before and during negotiations, the
state can accumulate knowledge about its interests, those of
the parties involved, and about the project characteristics.
Understanding the possible dynamic associated with
different industries at the outset of the negotiations can
help the government negotiators raise issues that might
otherwise be overlooked. Rarely will a state-TNC
negotiation be a single-issue negotiation based upon the
"price" of the investment as proposed by the simply buyer-
seller model. Dunlop suggests that even when cost is the
issue, it can be decomposed into more than one issue such
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as, in the case of foreign investment project, the type of
project financing and the sequencing of the investment.[35]
Other issues related to the "price" of the investment
agreement are ownership; industry structure including market
share and the number of firms allowed to compete in the
industry; the level of local content required in the
manufacture of the goods; import and export permits or
quotas and trade balance requirements; tax incentives or
regulations; and other restrictions and incentives relating
to firm performance.
The number of negotiable issues may be numerous and
allow more possibilities for trading concessions, promises--
and threats--in order to reach an agreement. Yet, without
knowledge of the range of possibilities and constraints, the
negotiation might be limited to the priorities of one party
or the agreement will not reflect what will, over time, be
concerns of the state.
Two specific examples of of knowledge and information
are discussed. Knowledge about precedent-setting can
increase a party's understanding of potential constraints in
the negotiation. Precedents set at previous negotiations or
inherent to particular government or corporate policies may
bind a party to certain issues. For example, the TNC cannot
ignore the way in which agreements registered in one country
will be viewed in other countries. In addition, corporate
ex..ecutives and government officials will be concerned about
avoiding political liabilities associated with any
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precedents that are set in the current negotiation. The
more a party permits (or must permit) a precedent to
constrain their decision-making flexibility, the more likely
will strong positions characterize the bargaining.
Sometimes precedents are used by a party as a
negotiating strategy. A TNC or host country might maintain
that if it agrees to a particular demand in this situation,
it will be obliged to do so in every situation. "The
quintessence of this particular gambit is the most favored
company or most favored government provision."[36)
Accumulating knowledge about precedents set prior to a
negotiation and identifying the parties' concerns over
precedent-setting enables the negotiators to address issues
that might otherwise send incorrect or damaging signals.
More options will be generated to expand the range of
possible solutions.
Knowledge about the project characteristics can
determine the strength or weakness of the parties in the
negotiation and over time. Some characteristics include the
size of the investment, the technology associated with the
investment, and the type of industry. In situations where
the state is in a weak bargaining position, it can impose
rules to strengthen its position.
Over time, projects that require large fixed
investments will tend to leave the foreign investor
vulnerable to host country demands.[373 Generally, such
large fixed investments are associated with extractive
industries. The terms to gain entry in the host-country
*2 5
usually are very favorable for the TNC, over time the
investment is perceived as a "hostage" of the state and the
state is able to exert greater control and make larger
demands on the TNC.[383
Manufacturing industries tend not to be associated with
large initial capital investments so the bargain
"obsolesces" in favor of the firm rather than the
country.[393 Yet, the ratio of fixed investment to total
investment for an automobile manufacturer will be
significantly larger than that for a microcomputer
manufacturer. The recent revamping of the Ford plant in
Mexico to produce Topaz models was $40 million.E403 By
contrast, Apple's investment in its joint venture in Mexico
was only $600,00C) in the first year.[41] The firm with a
small fixed investment will be less vulnerable to host-
country demands over time since less investment can become
captive of the host. Based on this logic, Ford will be less
likely to leave Mexico than Apple because of its sunk
investment.
Generally, the less stable the technology associated
with the investment, the weaker is the state's bargaining
strength.[42) It has already been noted the general
advantage TNCs have over technology in foreign investment.
The more changeable a technology, the greater the risks
involved in committing an investment such technology.
A TNC is more likely to have the scientific and
financial resources to take advantage of a fast-paced
26
technology, but, if the state recognizes its potential
weakness, it can try to remedy the situation by policy or
rule changes. Grieco demonstrated that the Indian
government was able to react quickly and effectively to the
rapidly changing technology associated with the computer
industry in the seventies; it was able to recognize the
shift in the technological emphasis from large computer
systems to small systems and engineer its computer policy
goals to accomodate the change.[433 In effect, the
stability of technology may not be a variable in determining
the potential bargaining strength of a state if the state
can muster its scientific and financial resources to make
educated decisions about the technology. Over time,
industrializing countries--particularly those Grieco terms
"assertive upper tier" countries like India, Brazil, and
Mexico--have not been as vulnerable to the technology
variable in determining its potential for bargaining
strength.E44]
Understanding and gathering information about these
project characteristics enables the state to identify those
issues that will improve their bargaining position over
time.
Comp&etiti on: Generating Alternativyes and Shaping PEce~tions
The role of competition is often noted in studies as a
potential source of bargaining power.[45] However, other
case studies have shown that Mexico has not often been able
to take advantage of the presence of competition.
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The central notion of why competition can be a source
of bargaining power is the notion of a good alternative.[46]
By having a good alternative to a negotiated agreement, a
party may be able to satisfy its interests even if an
agreement is not reached.[47) This increases its bargaining
power in the negotiation. Competition among states or firms
expands the number of alternatives for the other side. A
highly competitive investment environment among foreign
firms is a potential source of bargaining strength for the
state because greater numbers of firms increase the number
of alternatives available and allow the state to play the
firms demands off one another. In India, the growing
international competition in the 1970's between small-system
computer companies and the proliferation of semiconductor
and component manufacturers interested in selling to new
markets gave the Indian government additional bargaining
power. The government was able to make demands on TNCs
since it had other firms to turn to.[483
Knickerbocker has documented evidence that suggests
foreign investment tends to occur in industries
characterized by oligopolistic competition. Even then, the
host country may be able to take advantage of competitive
behavior between firms as a source of bargaining strength.
When a firm in an oligopolistic industry first makes a move
to enter a foreign market, the other firms in the oligopoly
display what is known as "oligopolistic reaction."[493 It
is a defensive investment strategy for one firm to match the
actions of another so that no one firm can undercut another.
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The result is a burst of competitive investment during a
relatively short period of time. If the host country
recognizes the increased level of competition, it can be
"window of opportunity" for improving the country's
potential bargaining strength.E503
This "window of opportunity" may be lost to governments
after some of the firms are invested. However, if the
oligopolistic structure of the industry repeats itself in
the host country, the state may be able to rely on the
defensive investment dynamic among firms to enforce
government demands. As long as one rival firm responds to
government edict, others in the oligopoly will also
respond.E51]
Today, the role of competition is even more important
as a source of bargaining power because of the drop in total
foreign investment over the last five years. The total
amount of new foreign investment in Latin America dropped
over 55 percent between 1981 and 1984. Foreign investment
in the world is increasingly the reinvestment of retained
earnings rather than new investment.[523 At the same time,
competition among governments for foreign investment is
increasing. Governments are "actively vying for the
opportunity to serve as hosts for foreign firms."[533
Countries must improve their position relative to other
countries demonstrating attractive investment climates.
Therefore, just as competition among firms for a
particular investment project gives a country bargaining
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strength, so too does competition among countries give
bargaining strength to the TNC. Encarnation writes,
"Foreign enterprises, from their perspective, have much to
gain from the increased competition among countries for
investment."[54] For example, a firm that is courted by
several countries for its investment will benefit from tax
breaks, grants, and other investment incentives.
While real competition is important as a source of
bargaining strength, the ability to influence the other
side's perception of competition plays an important role as
a source of bargaining strength. Heightening the perception
of the other side's competitive position is a tactic that
can increase bargaining strength.
LOng!E[Iiat ion: Reconciling Competinq Injterests
Because of the increased competition among countries,
firms will now take into consideration, along with the costs
of imvestment, the costs of negotiating in a country.
"Negotiations may be long and thus costly in
management time. The outcome of the negotiations,
or subsequent implementation of terms agreed to,
may be so uncertain as to repel attractive
investors. The failure of governments to
establish appropriate structures and procedures
may thus diminish the level and type of investment
sought either by the firm or by the host
government. "[553
What are "appropriate structures?" The idea that
governments should consider their institutional negotiating
arrangement in order to increase their bargaining strength
vis-a-vis the TNC is not a new concept. In the seventies,
critics of foreign investment for developing countries made
recommendations to encourage countries to achieve a unified
front vis-a-vis the TNC and improve their capacity to
achieve a broader policy perspective for each investment
considered. By centralizing and coordinating decision-
making, they argued, a host-country would be able to gain
more favorable terms from an investment. Encarnation and
Well's findings indicate that the very strategy suggested by
critics of foreign investment is today the one that invites
more foreign investment.[563 Different decision-making
arrangements, however, have different costs and benefits.
For example, coordinating decision-making and negotiating
functions can result in accomodating the wider policy
perspective of the government while "diffusing" decision-
making may allow a specific agency to accumulate expertise
in a particular industry.[57]
Central to the idea of improving bargaining strength
through institutional arrangements is that the state is not
monolithic. Most authors will agree that TNCs are
successful at maintaining a focused, unified perspective
vis-a-vis the state. Corporations like IBM that are very
centralized and coordinated in their management and
operations will be particularly likely to present a unified
front during the bargaining. The preferences of the state,
however, are likely to be divided and shift over the course
of the negotiation as events occur and decisions are
made.E58] This can be a disadvantage for a host country
government in negotiations with a more focused TNC.
The Mexican government has tried to coordinate their
31
negotiation structure by establishing the Foreign Investment
Commision comprised of the seven ministries in the
government. The benefit of such an interagency board is
that interministerial conflict is reduced since all
ministers consider the impacts of the investment from the
wider policy perspective. The larger policy issues, the
impact on the investment climate, and the impact on other
investors are considered.
However, while decision-making is coordinated,
negotiation and implementation of foreign investment
decisions are separate activities that occur in the Ministry
of Industry and Commerce. The industry groups in the
Ministry of Industry and Commerce can muster technical
expertise for specific industries, contribute to the
government's organizational learning, and prevent bribery
and "deal-making" that can occur when one agency has
complete control over the decision-making.[59]
However, a price is paid for separating the decision-
makers from the implementors because the investor's
negotiating costs may be increased. Foreign investors may
fear a lack of efficient follow-through of investment
decisions. Separating decision-making from negotiating may
result in competing interests within the government. The
larger policy issues may, in fact, undermine the interests
of other agencies and their constituencies.
These four sources of bargaining power only represent
the potential power available to the state in negotiating
with the TNC. Actually achieving greater bargaining power
and--remedying the lopsided negotiation--depends on the
skillful manipulation of these and other factors.
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PART II. MEXICO AND IBM
"...the heady atmosphere of
negotiations for high stakes in a
heated political environment..."
-- Louis Wells.
(1977)
A. INTRODUCTION
On January 19, 1985, the Mexican Foreign Investment
Commission (FIC) rejected IBM's proposal to manufacture
microcomputers in Mexico. The proposal promised state-of-
the-art product and manufacturing technology, reliance on
local suppliers and, most importantly, foreign exchange
earnings of over $500 million per year. IBM has had a
strong corporate policy of operating only wholly-owned
subsidiaries. Because IBM insisted on 100"/. ownership of its
Mexico operations--the antithesis of Mexico's legal
requirement that all foreign enterprises have majority
Mexican ownership--its proposal was rejected. Exemption
from the "Mexicanization" rule required special permission
which the FIC was not prepared to offer. The issue of
ownership became the focus of substantial public controversy
following'Mexico's decision to reject IBM's initial
proposal.
Mexico's decision to reject IBM's offer followed a
period of controversy within the Ministry of Industry and
Commerce between two lower tiers of officials. The office
of the Undersecretary of Foreign Investment liked IBM's
proposal while the office of the Undersecretary of
Industrial Development opposed it. Dr. Jose Warman,
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director of the government's electronic industry overseer
group within the office of Industrial Development, was
responsible for the development of Mexico's computer
industry program from its inception in 1981. He felt IBM's
entry into the Mexican market would undermine the
development and growth of the microcomputer industry in
Mexico. Journalists picked up the story from disgruntled
officials in Warman's office.[11 Much of the leaked
information focused on the potential loss of Mexican
sovereignty and the unfair monopoly advantage that IBM would
have over indigenous companies if it were allowed to come
into the market as a wholly-owned subsidiary.
The controversy mushroomed beyond the ranks of the
federal government. As a result of the media attention, a
private sector lobby called AMFABI (Asociacion Mexicana de
Fabricantes de Bienes Informaticos) organized to oppose
IBM's proposal. Made up of small, independent manufacturers
and joint-venture firms led by Apple de Mexico and
Microcomputadoras-HF (the Hewlett-Packard affiliate), AMFABI
argued that IBM should have to follow the same rules as the
rest of the microcomputer industry. Alligning itself with
nationalistic concerns, AMFABI argued that IBM's entry under
a special arrangement would affect the ability of other
manufacturers to grow.[2] One Hewlett-Packard spokesman
said:
"The investment desire in this industry is clear, and
Mexico has gotten very respected companies to
participate here as minority partners. (IBM) should
follow the same rules as the rest of us."[3]
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Even the Mexican Congress got involved in the IBM
debate. The united Communist and Socialist parties spoke
out against the IBM proposal.[4] To the dismay of those
inside the government who had engaged the Communist and
Socialist opposition, the statements of the Communist and
Socialist parties resulted in unifying the more powerful
government party, the PRI (Partido Revolucionario
Institucional), in favor of the proposal.E53 Congressional
involvement is important as a symbolic event in domestic
politics and heightened public awareness of the controversy;
in the end, though, the Congress carried little weight in
the rest of the IBM negotiation. Labor, "a pillar of the
PRI," was a very minor issue in the negotiations.E63
IBM was a known entity in Mexico. Their existing
wholly-owned subsidiary manufactured office equipment (the
Selectric III typewriter) and minicomputers (System/36) in
Mexico for the local market and for export to Latin American
and Asian markets. Their $6.6 million proposal to produce
IBM-PCs, PC-juniors, and PC-XTs and ATs involved the
expansion of their facility near Guadalajara. Thus, their
proposal represented, primarily, more export earnings for
the country rather than substantial new capital investment.
IBM had been in Mexico for fifty-five years and took
advantage of its commendable corporate record to fight for
its proposal. Advertisements and public statements boasted
IBM's contibutions to industrial development in Mexico,
their support of local suppliers of parts and components,
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and IBM's commitment to export-earnings through production
of quality products that can compete in world markets.
Their exports, IBM claimed, went to thirty countries in
Latin American, the Far East, and quality-conscious Japan.
Between 1982 and 1984, the company had generated export
earnings for Mexico of $50 million and purchased local parts
and components worth $2.5 million.C73 On the other hand,
$2.5 million was not necessarily something to boast about.
Those opposed to the IBM proposal argued that the company
had a poor record of using local suppliers.
IBM tried to build a coalition with local suppliers and
distributors to press for a favorable FIC decision. Though
these groups knew they would benefit if IBM got what it
wanted, they were not willing to assume an active role on
the company's behalf.[B9 It is likely that they saw the
possibility of gaining even more favorable terms if they
remained silent and IBM was forced to accede to the
government's demands.
At the January meeting of the Foreign Investment
Commission, the office of Industrial Development presented
a report demonstrating that a favorable response to IBM's
proposal would undermine the success of the domestic
computer industry. The FIC, under pressure from the
government officials who strongly opposed the project,
rejected IBM's proposal. This moved the negotiations into a
second phase.
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B. ANALYSIS OF THE CASE
The Buyer and the Seller
The Mexican government. Mexico's approach to negotiating
with foreign investors is designed to take account of the
competing interests of the separate branches of government.
The goal is to improve Mexico's bargaining position by
coordinating interests across the various ministries and to
ensure that conflicts within the government team would not
work to the advantage of the foreign investor.
The President of the Republic dominates government
decision-making in Mexico. Though greater pluralism and
delegation of authority has been encouraged recently, when
the President chooses to intervene, he becomes the chief
decision-maker (See Figure 2). In the case of the
negotiation with IBM, the President did not intervene until
after the FIC's initial rejection of IBM's proposal. In the
end, the President made the final decision.
Seven ministries are represented on the National
Foreign Investment Commission (NFIC): Interior, Foreign
Affairs, Finance and Public Credit, National Resources,
Industry and Commerce, Labor and Social Welfare, and
Programming and Budget. The NFIC is required to set
conditions of investment wherever an action deviates from
the rules of the 1973 Foreign Investment Law (See Exhibit
I). The Law states that a Mexican partner must hold at
least 51-4 of the controlling interest for enterprises in
specified industries in Mexico. The state maintains that
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Figure 2. Organization Chart for IBM Negotiations.
President de la Madrid
National Foreign Investment Commission
------------------------------------------------------------
Interior Finance i National Labor &
---- Publ ic Resources Social
Credit --------- Welfare
~------- --- ------ -----------
Foreign Industry & Programming
Affairs Commerce & Budget
~------- --- ------ -----------
Minister of Industry & Commerce
--------------------------- 
--
Undersecretary Undersecretary Undersecretary
of Foreign of Foreign of Industrial
Trade Investment Development
Director of Director of
Foreign Computer
Investment Industry
(Mario Espinoza (Jose Warman)
de los Reyes) -------------
---------------------------------------------
Note that IBM's proposal is first presented to the Foreign
Investment branch of the Ministry of Industry and Commerce.
Negotiation and implementation occur within this Ministry.
Final decision on foreign investment proposals is made by
the Foreign Investment Commission.
--------------------------------------------
Source: Allen Krause, Interview; Mexico: Foreign
Investment Law and its Guidelines. Mexico:
Instituto Mexicano de Comercio Exterior, (1984).
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forcing foreign investors to share equity allows it to reap
more of the economic benefits from economic growth. The
state wants Mexican companies to retain a significant
proportion of corporate earnings and acquire managerial
control.[9] IBM requested FIC exemption from the 100%
ownership stipulation.
While the FIC is the coordinating and decision-making
body, actual negotiations are handled by the Ministry of
Industry and Commerce. The ministry is organized into three
branches. They are the Undersecretaries of Foreign Trade,
Foreign Investment, and Industrial Promotion. Each agency
has developed separate expertise and negotiating skill with
respect to its particular responsibilities. From the
foreign investor's perspective, however, the three-part
structure, as well as the separation between the Ministry
and the FIC is problematic. For example, when the IBM
negotiators asked for additional import permits as part of
their overall investment agreement, the official in the
office of Foreign Investment replied that though he had no
objection to allowing IBM more permits, it was not his
responsibility to make such a decision--it was the
reponsibility of the Undersecretary of Trade.E103
The Mexi can pri vate sector. In 1985, the chief
manufacturers of single-user microcomputers were Apple de
Mexico, Printaform and Denki (both national firms), Micros-
HP (Hewlett-Packard), Croxico, (Cromemco), Micron and Mexel
(national firms). Apple de Mexico alone produced and sold
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8,550 single-user units. The remaining 15,285 units sold in
1985 (a total of 23,835 valued at $59.3 million) were shared
by the six other producers.[11] The Mexican
manufacturers, led by Apple de Mexico and Micros-HP
(Hewlett-Packard), were not prepared to sit on the sidelines
during the negotiations. Yet, national entrepreneurs are
traditionally left out of industry negotiations in Mexico.
They were not consulted during the negotiations; the Mexican
government took responsibility for articulating their
concerns.
Other segments of the Mexican private sector affected
by the negotiations were local suppliers (producers) of
parts and components and local distributors of computers.
Supplier firms have an expressed interest in upgrading their
operations and increasing their business to local
manufacturers of computers and saw themselves benefiting
from the IBM investment. At present, no quality, high
technology products such as semiconductors or circuit boards
are produced domestically, although these producers have a
potential advantage in the production of "passive"
components such as cables which are heavy parts for the
firms to ship from abroad.[12] Other components
include plastic, fiberglass, and aluminum pieces and
cabinets for the computers.
The approximately 400 local distributors of computers
are very important to the sale and marketing of computers in
Mexico. Distributors work with several product lines and
need to train and support computer purchasers in a much more
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comprehensive way than has been necessary in the United
States.[13] IBM is restricted from owning its own
distributorship, but has a vested interest in providing
financial and technical assistance to those distributors
that sell and support their products for the home
market. C14]
International Business Machines. In 1985, IBM was the
world's seventh largest industrial company with total
receipts from sales of over fifty billion dollars. Of the
top ten companies, only IBM and General Electric (at tenth)
are not automobile or oil companies.[15] IBM holds 70
percent of the world's mainframe computer market,
approximately 40 percent of the market for minicomputers,
and, since 1983 when the IBM-PC was introduced, IBM has
aggressively captured up to 60 percent of the personal
computer market. [16) In the view of some industry
observers, it is less IBM's technological superiority and
more its efficient manufacturing, management, and marketing
strategies (IBM can rely on name-recognition better that
other firms) that give IBM its competitive edge.[173 IBM's
products set the standard for the world's business computer
industry; other firms survive by manufacturing IBM
compatible machines and software or by carving out a special
market niche that IBM has not penetrated.
IBM has developed a reputation for being a good
corporate citizen as well as a clever political operator.
IBM employs almost entirely local professionals in its
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foreign subsidiaries. In addition, IBM keeps staff employed
as government liaisons to stay abreast of emerging issues
that may affect the company. During the Mexican
negotiations, these individuals kept in constant contact
with top level officials. Politically and financially, IBM
sees it as in its interest to identify a country's
industrial development needs and target its projects to
accommodate those needs. IBM also publicizes its
intentions. Months before IBM presented its first proposal,
Rodrigo Guerra Botello, the president of IBM Mexico,
advertised IBM's interest in Mexico's well-being: "the most
important thing is to produce exports and foreign exchange
for Mexico."[18]
Cgmqgting Interests
IBM's interests. IBM offered its first proposal in March
1984. At a meeting with Mexican officials, IBM presented
it--the "Office of the Future"--a total business system with
typewriters, wordprocessors, tele-communications devices,
and, of course, microcomputers.[19] In the same month, IBM
announced in the United States the company's plans to triple
its 1983 output of microcomputers and to spend $500 million
to expand production capacity and conduct further R&D on
small systems. Plans included doubling a one-machine-per-
fifteen-second pace of production.E20]
IBM proposed new investment in Mexico totalling only
$6.6 million dollars; IBM would produce microcomputers by
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expanding its existing facility. Of the total $500 million
dollars the company proposed to spend worldwide on small
systems, the $6.6 million it proposed to spend in Mexico was
only one percent of the total. An apparent "drop in the
bucket"; yet, IBM's interest in Mexico was very much linked
to its global strategy. At the time, IBM had four other
microcomputer manufacturing plants in other parts of the
world: Boca Raton, Florida; Wangaratta, Australia; Austin,
Texas and Greenock, Scotland.[21) A new facility on the
Pacific Ocean would be of great strategic importance for IBM
given its interest in increasing exports to Latin America,
the Far East and back to North America.
IBM saw several advantages to expanding their Mexican
operation as the next manufacturing site. Brazil had a
market three of four times that of Mexico's, but Brazil was
closed to IBM. The Brazilian Informatics Law permits only
national computer companies to produce and sell
microcomputers, minicomputers, and peripheral equipment in
Brazil. Argentina, with its strong labor unions and other
non-Latin American countries like South Korea seemed
politically risky. Unlike these countries, Mexico has a
history of very little labor conflict and remarkable
political stability.
Mexico also offered other advantages to IBM. Mexico
was close to corporate headquarters. IBM's New York
corporate headquarters is only a four hour plane ride from
Mexico City. An operation in Mexico would also be
relatively easy and inexpensive since it involved the
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expansion of an existing facility as opposed to construction
of an entirely new plant. IBM had the testing rooms,
equipment, and a core of management personnel already in
place.E223 In addition, the United States sollare was very
strong at the time when the Mexican peso was devaluating.
Though the Mexican market was small compared with
Brazil's market, it was growing. Infotext's 1985 market
study for the microcomputer industry in Mexico projected
units sales increasing at a compound average growth rate of
44 percent per year from 19e5 to 1990 rising to more than
225,00C) units in 1990, a market value of over $285
million.[231 Demand for IBM-PCs was particularly strong--
especially among government and large business users who
represent the fastest growing segments of the market.
In terms of corporate strategy, a precedent set in one
country matters for IBM's global operations. Thus, IBM
pushed hard on its policy of establishing a manufacturing
plant on a wholly-owned basis. "Because a single
government's actions can affect other parts of a company,
few multinational managements can safely ignore the
implications of business-government negotiations in any one
country. "[24)
IBM's commitment to maintaining consistent policies
throughout the world was demonstrated by its withdrawal from
India in 1978 because of government pressure to share equity
in the operations.[25] Consistency in policy is of greater
interest to IBM than participation in any particular market.
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Linked to IBM's interest in maintaining consistent
corporate policy is their interest in maintaining a "good
corporate citizen" image. In June 1984, the European
Economic Community announced it intended to charge IBM with
abusing its dominant market position in Europe, thus
stifling competition, but IBM negotiated a settlement soon
thereafter. Negotiations centered on the issue of whether
IBM would be forced to disclose proprietary information
regarding its technology in order to remain in the European
community. IBM's fight to clear its name was captured in
one IBM observer's statement, "Whatever IBM is agreeing to,
you can be sure that there are strategies, tactics and
business practices that will work against the EEC." [26)
Ultimately, IBM agreed to provide competitors with timely
information about their newest technologies so that their
machines could be made compatible with IBM machines. This
agreement was reported to have significant implications for
IBM's technology and marketing strategies.[273 In Europe,
IBM successfully fought the antitrust charges: by July
1985, the EEC announced that IBM was satisfactorily carrying
out the terms of its agreement in Europe.
Mexico's comEuter policy. Internal conflict over IBM's
proposal emerged between the offices of the Undersecretary
of Foreign Investment and the Undersecretary of Industrial
Development. Officials in the latter branch, particularly
Dr. Warman in the electronics industry group, strongly
opposed the IBM proposal on the grounds that the fledgling
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domestic industry needed to be protected. The conflicting
interests are symbolic of the broader Mexican economic
policy controversy between import substitution
industrialization and export-promotion strategies.
Between 1977 and 1981, demand for computers had grown
35 percent. Mexico imported all of its small computers with
95 percent coming from the United States. Industry
officials believed that the growth in computer imports was
exacerbating Mexico's trade deficit which rose 17 percent to
$4.8 billion in 1981.[283 At the height of this computer
boom, the Mexican officials in Industrial Development
announced their new computer policy. The rules were
straight-forward and based on the 1973 Foreign Investment
Law requiring majority Mexican ownership of manufacturing
enterprises. Firms would be required to assemble
minicomputers and microcomputers locally. Microcomputer
operations would be required to "Mexicanize. " Companies were
expected to match imports with exports within four years of
operation and firms had to sharply increase the value added
by Mexican production. Mexico imposed stringent quotas on
further imports to back these objectives (See Exhibit
II).[29)
By the beginning of 1982, approximately forty-five U.S.
computer companies had rushed to apply to produce computers
and peripheral equipment locally. Among the firms that
established minicomputer assembly plants in Mexico were IBM,
Burroughs, NCR, Wang Labs, Hewlett-Packard, Mohawk Data
Sciences, Basic Four Information Systems and Prime
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Computers. E303
Enthusiastic demand projections for computers in Mexico
led to the rush to claim market shares. Even with the 1982
economic crisis when sales of computers dropped forty
percent, investors were optimistic. The market was expected
to grow fifteen percent annually in 1982 and 1983 and
twenty-five percent annually after 1985. Between 1983 and
1985, the number of units sold increased more that 375
percent.[31] Dr. Warman proudly emphasized the fact that
the industry remained largely Mexican owned.[32)
After equity requirements, local content and a firm's
trade balance are the two key requirements that the
overseers of the electronics industry closely monitor.
Local content requirements are the country's way of ensuring
the development of the domestic industry as well as saving
foreign exchange. The computer policy requires that for
each computer manufactured in Mexico, 35 percent of its
parts and components be domestically manufactured, increased
to 45 percent over four years. Since parts and components
produced in Mexico are generally uncompetitive on the basis
of price and quality in comparison to imported parts and
components, firms would prefer to import their entire stock
of parts and components.
The government monitors the computer industry by
issuing import permits for those parts and components
unavailable in Mexico--the expensive electronic components.
A firm's survival depends upon its ability to obtain import
permits for the components necessary to build computers.[333
A firm may be able to negotiate whether "content" will be
measured in terms of quantity or value. A firm may also
obtain more import permits for exporting goods at least
equal to the value of those it imports, thus rewarded for
meeting trade balance requirments. Most firms have been able
to meet the local content requirements by limiting their
imports to the most expensive electronic components
unavailable in Mexico.
Though the government pressures microcomputer
manufacturers to keep Mexican list prices alligned with U.
S. prices, low volumes of production and domestic content
requirements limit a firm's ability to compete in terms of
price and quality on the international market. In Mexico,
price differentials (between Mexico and the United States)
are high--between 25 and 300 percent--according to one
Commerce official.[343
Smuggling of cheaper microcomputers from across the
border remains a serious problem.[35] Since Mexico shares a
2,000 mile border with the United States where almost all of
Mexico's computers come from, it is not difficult to
imagine that smuggling occurs. One observer suggested that
contraband units could amount to as much as 50 percent of
the total units installed. In addition, many units are
assembled in garage-style operations by individuals who wait
patiently to obtain import permits. They buy microcomputers
in the United States, ship them to the border where they are
53
disassembled, cross the border, and re-assemble them to sell
as locally manufactured computers.E363 "Screwdriver
technology," as one observer notes, continues to plague the
quality of units produced in Mexico and, therefore, the
industry itself.[37]
Meeting trade balance requirements is virtually
impossible. "Passive" components that can be produced even
somewhat less-expensively in Mexico are exported to try and
balance imports with exports. Only a firm such as Hewlett-
Packard that operates its joint-venture in cooperation with
its wholly-owned minicomputer subsidiary appears to be able
to approach the export targets determined by the level of
imports through transfer pricing arrangements.[38) The
export targets effectively encourage firms to inflate the
prices of their exports which will make them less
competitive still.
The problems and ambiguities within the Mexican
microcomputer industry are a result of expensive local
content requirements and the need for local producers to
import the most expensive components--printed circuit boards
and integrated circuits--from abroad. Officials in the
Industrial Development office feel strongly that these
problems can be solved in the long run by building the
industry from the bottom up--by developing a semiconductor
industry in Mexico. Unfortunately, in the last few years,
the semiconductor industry in the United States has declined
sharply. Japanese firms have been tremendously successful
in producing high volumes of very powerful and cheap
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circuits. Compounded by an overall slowdown in the computer
industry, the prospect was poor for developing a Mexican
semiconductor industry that could effectively compete in
price and quality with "internationally sourced"
components. [393
According to the officials in Industrial Development,
these problems indicated that the Mexican computer industry
needed continued government protection. Allowing IBM entry
into the market without enforcing the joint-venture
requirement would give the company a competitive advantage
that could force all smaller producers out of business.
IBM's entry would undermine the potential for success of the
Mexican-owned industry and raise questions about the
legitimacy of the computer policy itself.
Mexico's foreign investment 2olicy. The year after the
computer policy decree was announced in 1981, President de
la Madrid began his term of office. The new sexenio (six-
year Presidential term of office) coincided with another
massive devaluation of the currency. Private banks and
their holdings had been nationalized just before the change
in office. With a foreign debt of over $50 billion and in
desperate need of foreign exchange, Mexico sought to
liberalize its foreign investment rules. A Mexican
economist, quoted in the Wall Street Journal in June of
1982, explained the issue this way:
"Allowing more foreign investment is the only way
Mexico can get hold of large amounts of money
without getting on its knees and begging to the
banks."
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Since 1982, the Mexican government has publicly
reiterated its interest in attracting foreign investment.
Yet, after years of Mexicanization and very restrictive
and protectionist trade policies, few observers were
convinced of Mexico's intentions to liberalize.
The computer industry policy was a case in point.
Mexico's intention to encourage foreign investment appeared
contradictory to its Mexicanization policy. In fact, in
1984, the government did offer Apple Computer, Inc. and
Hewlett-Packard exemption from the Mexicanization equity
requirements and offered them a chance to operate in Mexico
with 100/% ownership. To the surprise of some analysts, Apple
and HP refused. Investinq as a minority partner is one form
of risk-minimization strategy that TNCs adopt. In fact, at
the time, Mexico was only beginnig to show signs of economic
recovery. Said one Apple executive: "We prefer 49% of
something viable right out of the chute rather than 100% of
something more risky."E403 The end result was a computer
policy implemented as intended by Industry Development
officials with equity, local content, and trade balance
requirements intact. The computer policy was in conflict
with the new foreign investment policy.
By 1984, there was mounting pressure for Mexico to
prove its commitment to liberalize trade and foreign
investment. In February 1984, to encourage more foreign
investment, Mexico announced that while the 1973 Foreign
Investment Law would remain in effect, the ownership rules
would be relaxed for "priority" industries, favoring firms
that produced for export. One of these industries was high
technology electronics. E41] It was this announcement that
spurred IBM to formulate its March 1984 investment proposal.
After several months of redrafting and minor changes,
IBM formally announced its Mexican investment proposal at
its Armonk, New York corporate headquarters on October 2 5 ,
1984. There was great speculation about the details of the
proposal and the debate within the Ministry began in
earnest. Unofficially, the Mexican government was prepared
to accept the proposal if IBM was willing to increase its
local content from 35 percent to 50 percent. A preliminary
authorization on the IBM proposal was scheduled for the
November 19 meeting of the Foreign Investment Commission.
On that Monday morning, however, the Pemex natural gas tanks
exploded in the Tlalnepantla suburb north of Mexico City.
The deaths of over two hundred and fifty people took
precedence over the IBM decision for the frenzied Ministers
who arrived at the FIC meeting.[42]
A decision on IBM's proposal was delayed until January.
During the period of delay, the controversy resumed. The
ensuing debate moved back and forth between the issue of
ownership as required by the computer policy and ownership
allowed under the new foreign investment policy. After the
January rejection other issues arose as well.
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C. BARGAINING AND NEGOTIITION
The Aftermath of the ReIection
Despite the rejection, both sides desired to keep
negotiating. It had been almost a year since IBM first made
its "Office of the Future" presentation and proffered its
initial proposal. A few preliminary redraftings had been
passed back and forth before IBM's October announcement.
After the announcement, the company pursued a highly visible
promotional campaign. Yet, when the proposal was rejected in
January, both sides realized that all possible avenues had
not been explored.
Not only were both sides willing to keep negotiating,
after the official rejection, but both appeared committed to
reaching an agreement. Neither was happy with the
alternative of "no deal," nor were they willing to write off
IBM's existing operations in Mexico. The official reason
for the rejection was that what IBM offered to produce was
already available in Mexico. The Foreign Investment
Commision stated "there are companies manufacturing these
computers and using mainly national capital."[43] However,
no other small computer manufacturer in Mexico could offer
export earnings of over $500 million. IBM's technology,
volume of production, and ability to produce and market
goods competitively on the world market were beyond what the
government could force any local producer to achieve given
their past performance.
IBM, on the other hand, saw leaving Mexico to find
another site for their PC manufacturing facility as a worse
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fate than being subjected to Mexican delays and
restrictions. IBM had already invented considerable
resources in the negotiations in Mexico and felt that it
would lose its claim to a potentially large and growing
market. Though IBM may have considered abandoning its
Mexican expansion, in the end, it saw Mexico as its best
option in Latin America.
During the spring of 1985, John Akers, IBM's
president, visited President Alfonsin of Argentina and
suspicion grew that IBM was reconsidering Mexico
in favor of Argentina as the site for a new microcomputer
manufacturing plant. However, an Argentinian site would put
IBM in the position of possibly losing its 45 percent share
of the mainframe computer market in Mexico. For Mexico's
part, if IBM established a plant in Argentina, Mexico would,
ironically, have had to buy IBM microcomputers from
Argentina due to the Mexican-Argentine trade pact,
effectively undermining the original goal of Mexico's
computer program to restrict imports of microcomputers.[44]
One Commerce official said IBM and Mexico
had already traveled a long, hard road and neither was
willing to give up.[45]
Deesca lating the Conflict
In order to proceed, the government needed to address
three concerns. First, both sides needed to pull the
negotiations out of the public eye. Second, the overblown
issue of ownership needed to be deflated. Third, the parties
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needed to find ways of reconciling their competing
interests.
Low visibility._ The parties were successful in lowering
visibility in the second phase of the negotiation. IBM made
a decision to keep quiet about the negotiations in progress.
This met with the approval of the Mexican officials
involved. The highly public exposure had created an
atmosphere difficult to work in for both parties.
IBM's intention had been to publicize in order to buy
the pressure of public opinion to bear on the bureaucracy.
IBM's publicity appeared to be more defensive, however, than
opportunistic. As a result, the press--primarily editors
and correspondents--had taken a critical stance toward IBM.
This is not uncommon in developing countries where the press
often reflects nationalistic concerns.[463
On the government's side, the escalation of the public
debate had gotten beyond their control. Expectations on
both sides fo the issue were raised in the media that could
have ended in disappointment and possible embarrassment for
various Mexican officials.[47) The rejection released the
tension within the government and allowed both sides to
proceed again with fewer political liabilities.
The substance of the agreement (See Figure 3). IBM initially
limited the agenda for the negotiations to the issue of
ownership. IBM's first proposal for a wholly-owned
subsidiary was a document of only a few pages accompanied by
60
THE FIRST AND SECOND PROPOSALS
JANUARY PROPOSAL JULY PROPOSAL
I. Similar conditions held for both proposals:
* 100% wholly-owned subsidiary.
* A price differential of 10-15%.
* Production of 6 0 3 ,000 microcomputers over five years.
* IBM pledges to limit the time gap between the
introduction of a new line of Personal Computers
(PC) in the United States and its arrival in
Mexico to six months.
II. Key differences
*Exports
88-89% production
Export revenue:
$528 million/yr.
*Local Content
35% by end of the
first year.
50% after fourth year.
*Level of Investment
$6.6 million expansion
of existing facility.
*Exports
92% production exported.
Export revenue:
$620 million/yr.
*Local Content
51% by end of
82% by end of
the first year.
fourth year.
*Level of Investment
$91.1 million total investment
as follows:
-- over 5 years with $35
million into local R&D
-- provide $11.5 million in
financial & technical assistance
for new semiconductor plant
-- $20 million to develop local
suppliers.
-- $13 million for dealers &
distributor networks for those
PCs sold to the public.
-- other funds for university
support and software
development center.
*Employment 1 *Employment
80 direct jobs i 240 direct jobs
800 indirect jobs I 1460 indirect jobs
Source: Business Latin America, August 2 1 , 1985; Interviews.
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Figure 3.
a short market study justifying the level of output
proposed. The proposal included vague descriptions of
IBM's importance for the industry and IBM's contribution to
Mexican economic development. IBM did not analyze the cost
differences between expanding its existing facility versus
starting from scratch. The Mexican officials wanted to know
much more about how IBM intended to implement its proposals
regarding level of output, exports, local content, trade
balance, price differentials, technology, and marketing. In
many respects, the first proposal was merely a trial
balloon.
Other issues needed to be added to the agenda. If IBM
were allowed 100 percent ownership, what could it (should
it) offer in return? IBM presented its second proposal in
March, one year after the initial proposal. The Mexican
officials countered with a proposal of their own three weeks
later. Essentially the Mexican government was willing to
authorize IBM's entry if the company agreed to further
contingencies such as higher export levels and local content
requirements.
Other issues assumed greated importance: level of
exports, local content requirements, development of the
industry in Mexico.[48]
The level of exports was key. Forcing IBM to export a
large percentage of its output served a dual purpose--
satisfying both foreign investment interests and computer
policy interests. In the rejected proposal, IBM proposed to
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export 88 to 89 percent of its output. The Mexican
officials pushed for a greater percentage. In the end, IBM
agreed to export 92 percent of its production, leaving
approximately ten or eleven thousand computers a year to
sell on the domestic market. While still a substantial
market share, this limited IBM's participation in the local
market.
Local content was a second priority. IBM's first
proposal matched the computer industry program requirements
of 35 percent local content by the end of the first year and
up to 50 percent by the end of the fourth year. In the
fall, the Mexican officials suggested to IBM that its
proposal might be approved if it increased the local content
of its products to 50 percent the first year. In the final
agreement, IBM was required to achieve 51 percent domestic
content in each computer by the end of the first year and 82
percent by the end of the second year.
Forcing IBM to produce under high domestic content
requirements presumably led to bargaining over the number of
import permits the firm would be allowed. Since IBM
intended to export most of its production, the goods needed
to be competitively priced--a somewhat impossible task given
that the most expensive electronic components are not
available in Mexico. An alternative, of course, was to
build a new semiconductor production facility. Details are
sketchy, but despite the disagreement within the government
regarding the viability of a Mexican semiconductor industry,
IBM promised to pay for the construction of a semiconductor
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technology facility which the government will run. The
semiconductors are intended to be available for industry-
wide use.[49]
Related to local content was IBM's investment in
creating a network of local suppliers and distributorships.
Following the Ford Motor Company model for the development
of local suppliers of au.to parts in Mexico, IBM was expected
to invest in the devlopment of local computer parts
suppliers. [50] For instance, one Mexican supplier called
Mitel made an arrangement with IBM to obtain machinery and
technology that it lacked to produce cables for the
industry.[511 Ultimately, with a fifty-one percent local
content requirement, it is in IBM's interest to invest in
producing cheaper, quality parts and components locally.
IBM is restricted from owning distributorships in
Mexico. Thus, it must invest in distributorships without
equity participation. IBM will distribute its products
through established distributors that not restricted to
selling IBM machines exclusively. Improving domestic
marketing and sales operations in Mexico, is, again, in
IBM's interest. In addition, IBM promised to promote
international distribution of local suppliers' products. IBM
agreed to include Mitel's cables in its product catalog
distributed worldwide.[52]
Smaller concessions ranging from a redefinition of the
number of jobs IBM expected to create to delivering one
hundred IBM-PCs to the Ministry of Programming and Budget to
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help modernize the operations. However, "concession-adding"
during this stage antagonized IBM's representatives. While
the Mexican officials pressed for more on each issue, the
IBM representatives claimed they could not afford to add to
the proposal. In addition, it seemed every agency in the
government began sending in requests for items to be
included in the agreement.
Yet, IBM did not want to jeopardize the agreement.
While the bargaining continued in the Ministry of Industry
and Commerce, the negotiations moved up to a higher level of
decision-making, namely, the office of the President.
Decision-making. By centralizing the negotiations and
decision-making at the Presidential level, circumventing the
Ministry of Commerce and the FIC, Mexico was able to speak
with a single voice. Moreover, the broadest possible policy
perspective was maintained.
In the spring of 1985, despite the previous year's
hopeful recovery, the Mexican economy was in a fragile
position. Mexico was in the process of renegotiating its
debt with a number of foreign banks. Oil prices were
falling, inflation was on the rise, exchange rates were
uncertain, and the country was not meeting the IMF's
austerity targets. On April 1, Mexico reached agreement
with its commercial creditors to renew the terms of its
$48.7 billion debt. But, Mexico continued to be under
pressure from the IMF.
Presumably unbeknownst to IBM, United States Secretary
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of State George Schultz played a role during this period.
During a visit to Mexico, Schultz commented to President de
la Madrid that one way for Mexico to demonstrate to the IMF
its commitment to generating foreign exchange would be to
approve the IBM agreement.E533 Host countries perceive very
close liaisons between the United States government and
private foreign investors. Though the reality of such
liaisons is debated, the TNC draws an important source of
bargaining strength from such perceptions.E543 Schultz'
passing comment to President de la Madrid certainly
reinforced such perceptions and probably influenced the
final decision on the agreement.
As noted above, Mexican officials suspected that IBM
corporate headquarters was considering the possibility of
switching to other Latin American markets. Such suspicions
contributed to the perception that Mexico was, indeed,
competing with other countries around the world for limited
foreign investment opportunities.
Meanwhile, IBM's presence did not seem to stifle the
interest of other firms considering the Mexican market. In
May 1985, two companies--Tandy and Sperry Corp.--signed
joint ventures in Mexico to produce personal computers for
the Mexican market. Both companies decided to comply with
Mexicanization rules.E553 These firms, by choosing to
produce for the domestic market emphasized that Mexico's
market was still considered a potentially "hot" market, and
that the environment was still a competitive one for the
industry.
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By June, the decision was apparently made within IBM to
obtain agreement in Mexico rather than to look for an
alternative. Larry Ford, the director of IBM's Latin
American operation, came to Mexico and met with President de
la Madrid. The President was wise to wait until IBM sent
one of its chief decision-makers. Several times prior to
this meeting, the IBM subsidiary president, Rodrigo Guerra
Botello, had tried to meet with the President, but was not
received.[56] De la Madrid knew that regardless of what was
said or agreed upon, Guerra would need approval from the
corporate headquarters in New York.
The meeting with Larry Ford presumably "clinched" the
agreement. De la Madrid strongly advised that IBM agree to
the concessions proposed by the government in order to be
exempted from the Mexicanization rule.[57J The President
also strongly advised the Mexican officials and the FIC to
reconsider IBM's proposal.
The agreement
At the July meeting of the Foreign Investment
Commission, the Ministers reversed their earlier decision.
A low profile was maintained even to the end--the press
release included the new IBM decisions among six decisions
made by the FIC. IBM headquarters in Armonk, New York was
not aware of the decision at the time it was made.[583
Under the so-called "Compromise Program"., 92 percent of
IBM's output must be exported and and 51 percent local
content must be achieved by the end of the first year. IBM's total
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capital investment was increased from $6.6 million to $91
million. Part of this $91 million will cover the cost of
the semiconductor venture. A local supplier network will be
created, distributors will be trained, and IBM will provide
educational and technical assistance through the university
in Mexico.
IBM is now free to begin expanding, but details must
still be worked out. Mexican officials feel that they got
the main elements of the agreement that they wanted--a
transnational producer with worldwide distribution channels
to export Mexican products on the world market and the
development of local suppliers and distributors while
limiting IBM's presence on the Mexican market to protect the
domestic industry. In addition, Mexico demonstrated its
seriousness about liberalizing its foreign investment rules.
From IBM's standpoint, the agreement probably met the
firm's expectations though at a substantial cost in terms of
time and dollars. The company was able to maintain 10)
percent ownership of the subsidiary, implement a global
manufacturing strategy, and demonstrate their willingness to
negotiate as good corporate citizens.
Though most industry observers expected Mexico to
reverse its decision and allow IBM to enter the market, they
were generally surprised about the considerable increase in
the level of investment that IBM needed to promise. Critics
argued that IBM's promises were less meaningful than they
appeared, that Mexico was only able to gain concessions from
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IBM on the marginal issues.
The case of IBM in Mexico illustrates how the Mexican
state was able to enhance its bargaining position vis-a-vis
a potentially powerful TNC. A good working relationship was
maintained, important and relevant issues were raised,
competing interest were dealt with, and precedents were
skillfully managed. Mexico benefited somewhat from
competition, but also was strongly influenced by IBM's
leadership position in the industry and the company's
representations of hedging its interest in Mexico. Finally,
by circumventing lower-tier authorities, the final decision
was made using the ultimate coordinating strategy--
centralized the decision-making at the President's level.
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CONCLUSION
"I don't think there really
are any bargaining chips vis-
a-vis IBM, IBM just folds up
and goes someplace else."
-- Jagdish Bhagwati,
quoted in Wall Street
Journal after Mexico
rejected IBM's proposal.
The case of IBM in Mexico illustrates that a developing
country can tap various sources of bargaining strength
during its negotiations with a transnational firm.
The Relationship: Mexico and IBM
The interaction between Mexico and IBM exemplifies the
fundamental relationship between the state and the TNC:
each possesses resources that the other wants. IBM, as
seller of its productive capacity, possesses capital,
technology, and above all, access to export markets.
Mexico's goals are to develop its domestic computer industry
and to generate exports, particularly non-oil exports.
IBM's offer had the potential to achieve both goals.
Mexico., as seller of the investment opportunity.,
offered a potentially giant market that is very attractive
to IBM and other computer manufacturers. Mexico's 2gtential
market is its most powerful source of bargaining strength
because IBM and other firms will not risk losing a market
share in a potentially lucrative market. Furthermore, IBM
sees Mexico as a trade liaison with other Latin American and
Pacific markets--Mexico is a foothold into the rest of Latin
America. IBM needs to negotiate and operate in good faith
with Mexico in order to take advantage of Mexico's trade
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relations with the rest of Latin America.
The idea of the 2otential market counterbalances, to
some degree, the asymmetry between state and TNC since the
country's "turf" is precisely what is attractive to the TNC
and what the TNC would like access to. All other sources of
bargaining strength for Mexico build on this fundamental
resource.
Mexico was further able to enhance its bargaining
position because the parties anticipated their future
relationship. Mexico's rejection of IBM's first proposal
demonstrated their ability to exercise their bargaining
strength. While such a move might have threatened the
possibility for an agreement--and there were some suspicions
that it, in fact, did--Mexico felt in a strong position to
continue to demand changes and concession. The Mexican
officials maintained an open, communicative environment in
the second stage to maintain the relationship. They also
made clear representations to the company to indicate their
commitment to reaching agreement.
The three variables that may have affected how
influential the relationship was all worked to Mexico's
advantage. First, because IBM was already established in
Mexico, there was scarcely any doubt that Mexico and IBM
would continue to interact. This near-certainty motivated
the parties to build a good working relationship and make
commitments to lead to agreement. For example, though the
concession-adding process aggravated IBM representatives,
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they maintained a cooperative stance. Mexico gained
bargaining strength and was able to continue making demands
for the agreement since IBM was not willing to jeopardize
the future relationship. IBM made an attempt to maintain
good relations with the Ministry of Industry and Commerce
even while circumventing their authority.
Second, that IBM was producing for export may have
lessened its dependence on the Mexican government rules.
Yet, Mexico's relationship with IBM as exporter was not
weaker because IBM also had a minor interest for
manufacturing for the domestic market and has a significant
vested interest in developing the domestic parts and
components industry. Large business and government demand
for IBM computers will rapidly absorb the ten or eleven
thousand microcomputers that IBM is allowed to produce for
the domestic market. IBM may see stepped-up demand for
their units as an opportunity to renegotiate their
arrangement at some future date.
Third, because Mexico has targeted the computer
(electronics) industries as priority industries, the
importance of reaching agreements and building relationships
with IBM and other firms is therefore highlighted and worked
to Mexico's advantage in these negotiations.
Knowled2e aRnd Skill: Raisi ng IssUes
This case may support either of the two competing
hypotheses of how uncertainty alters the balance of
bargaining power over time in a state-TNC encounter. On one
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hand, the hypothesis that the state was at its weakest
during the negotiations suggests that once IBM sinks it
investment, and uncertainty dissipates, the state's
bargaining position will improve and the bargain will
obsolece further in favor of the state. On the other hand,
the hypothesis that a manufacturing firm is at its weakest
at the time of entry contributes to the scenario that Mexico
was in a strong bargaining position during the riskiest and
most uncertain stage of the investment, but its bargaining
power will diminish over time. This hypothesis suggests
that IBM will establish ties with local industrialists and
its bargaining power will increase against the state.
It is too soon to tell how the balance of bargaining
power will shift. Mexico was in a relatively strong
position which could wax stronger or wane relative to IBM.
During the negotiations, Mexico was able to set
the rules for IBM's proposal and the agreement. Mexico also
demonstrated its knowledge about the other party and the
project characteristics which allowed it to raise issues
besides ownership as important to the bargaining agenda.
For example, each party was concerned about the
precedents that could be set by the negotiation. Mexico
knew of IBM's previous exit from India and Nigeria due to
those countries' strict equity-sharing regulations. Mexico
also knew of IBM's concern to maintain a consistent
corporate policy of 100 percent ownership across countries.
Thus, Mexico used IBM's notable bottom line to raise other
relevant issues. Mexico had the freedom to be flexible on
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its rules as well as to impose new rules. The state could
demand concessions in return for exempting IBM from Mexico's
ownership rule. In the end, IBM did set a precedent. It
demonstrated its willingness to negotiate at a high cost to
be allowed to manufacture in a country. Most industry
observers were surprised by--and will remember--the level of
investment that IBM ultimately conceded to Mexico.
For Mexico's part, reversing the IBM decision served to
satisfy the competing interests within the government and
demonstrate the power of sending signals. While ensuring
that those in charge of the domestic computer industry
gained the concessions they felt were necessary for
protecting the existing producers, the IBM decision was a
signal. to the world that Mexico was serious about it's
intention to liberalize foreign investment per its new "open
door policy." By exempting IBM from the equity
requirements, Mexico proved its willingness to accomodate
foreign investment.
However, the President also skillfully eliminated the
possibility of political or practical liabilities in future
negotiations with TNCs by announcing that the IBM proposal
had been decided on its merits as a priority industry and
that all investment decisions in Mexico will be decided on a
case-by-case basis.E1] In other words, while strong signals
were sent, no ironclad precedents were set.
Mexico knew it would benefit from a large level of
investment. IBM's initial investment was only $6.6 million.
A low level of investment would have favored IBM's
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bargaining position over time since a lower level of
investment leaves the firm less vulnerable to demands from
the host country and more flexible to exit. However, the
fourteen-fold increase in the final investment from $6.6
million to $91 million was a demonstration of how Mexico was
able to anticipate a potential weak bargaining position and
change it into a strong one. IBM's large investment may
slow down or even eliminate IBM's ability to exit easily.
Thus, Mexico was able to target a characteristic of the
project that would have favored IBM over the long run and
impose demands that would alter the bargaining relationship.
CornpEtition: Mexico's Options and Percent ions
The role of competition among countries and among
firms can be a source of bargaining strength for the
opposing side because more alternatives allow a party more
flexibility in the negotiations. The competitive
environment for both firms and states is a potential source
of bargaining power, but it is a slippery concept. It is
difficult to exercise this source of bargaining strength.
It requires not only determining the level of competition
among firms, but also the competitive status of the state
among countries.
In this case, neither party had a particularly strong
alternative. Mexico could not enforce high exports from the
firms already in the industry. IBM did not have other
markets, other than Brazil, that looked as promising and
Brazil was closed to IBM and other foreign firms.
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Furthermore, Mexico seemed only vaguely aware of its
true competitive position, based primarily on general
feelings about its investment environment. After the
initial rejection, one business expert remarked in the Wall
Street Journal, "Right now, investors think a lot of other
countries [that] are more competitive and don't seem to have
the drawbacks that Mexico does."[23 IBM was able to further
these perceptions by delaying with its own internal
negotiations and making appearances that it was actively
exploring other sites for the investment.
To Mexico's advantage, computer firms still demonstrate
competitive behavior in the industry. Mexico initially
benefited from this competitive "window of opportunity"
after its 1981 compu~ter decree when so many firms rallied to
enter the Mexican market. While IBM had a particular
advantage over the other firms in the Mexican computer
industry because it was offering to produce for export
rather than solely for the domestic market, Mexico still
benefited from industry-wide competition. The January
rejection was an attempt to influence IBM's perception that
Mexico could rely on other firms who, unlike IBM, chose to
play by its rules. That Tandy Corp. and Sperry Corp. signed
their joint venture agreements just two months before the
final IBM decision was made, reinforced that perception.
Bennett and Sharpe point out that Mexico did not take
full advantage of the period of competitive behavior when it
bargained with the automobile manufacturers. Nor did Mexico
take advantage of the period of oligopolistic reaction in
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the steroid hormone industry according to Gereffi.[33 The
evidence is not convincing that Mexico was able to make
demands of IBM on the basis of competition for this case
either.
Mexico might well have taken the opportunity to bargain
with Apple de Mexico, Micros H-P and the other existing
firms to create a better range of alternatives and thus
strengthen its bargaining position vis-a-vis IBM. But, the
government found it difficult to bargain with the very firms
whose interests it felt pressure to protect during the
negotiation. And since Mexico has only a vague picture of
how it competes with other countries, it possibly
underestimated its bargaining position vis-a-vis the
established firms. Mexico would do well to take stock of
its competitive position for each industry and important
investment project. The government may find that Mexico is
to Latin American countries as IBM is to United States
computer firms--a leader among the competition.
Orgnization: Lndermining Eotntial Bargaigning Power
The striking similarity between IBM and Mexico can be
extended to their organizational styles. Achieving parity
between the leaders worked in this case for making a
decision given the extended and heated situation. Yet, this
fallback arrangement has implications that may be
detrimental for the outcome. The more centralized the
control, the less flexible are the rules of the game.
Furthermore, executive decision-makers risk
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undercutting the decisions of lower tier officials or
managers. As noted, there are some officials who feel that
the agreement is unstable since the "details" are still.
being worked out. While the decision was made by the
executive branch, the responsibility for implementing the
agreement still lies within the Ministry of Industry and
Commerce. The potential for a lower level agency to impose
its power administratively during implementation is
increased, particularly for a situation in which the second
tier of officials so strongly opposed the proposal.[43 That
the President referred the negotiation and implementation
back to the Ministry of Industry and Commerce and the formal
decision to the FIC was a supportive action that may ease
potential difficulty later. Yet, the possibility for slow
and inefficient implementation can adversely affect what
might otherwise be the obsolescing of the bargain in favor
of Mexico.
Not surprisingly, there remains a great deal of
uncertainty about the implementation of the agreement. One
Mexican official feels that the agreement is unstable. He
notes that IBM has not yet followed through on some of their
unwritten promises. For instance, IBM agreed to advertise
locally through the Mexican Chamber of Commerce and has not
done that yet.[5] The government is investing very little
energy in holding IBM to its promises. As far as the Mexican
officials are concerned, the agreement has been struck and
it is IBM's responsibility to live up to it. IBM, on the
other hand, is probably counting on slow implementation
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efforts by the government. IBM's strategy, suspects one
observer, will be to change the nature of comRgromisos from
promises IBM had to make to gain FIC approval to concessions
subject only to formal applications from the Mexican
officials.[6]
The intention of the Mexican computer industry
officials was to protect the existing industry from an
overwhelming IBM presence. There is still much speculation
about whether this will undermine the Mexican computer
industry. The fastest growing markets in Mexico were small
and large business segments for which IBM machines will
likely be favorites.[7] Apple de Mexico may be able to
maintain its lead in the educational market in Mexico, while
Micros H-P may be able to rely on a solid customer base of
Hewlett-Packard mainframe and minicomputer buyers. [8) Most
industry observers believe Apple de Mexico, Micros H-P and
the other firms will renegotiate the terms of their
investments with the Mexican officials.
The other smaller distributors may be able to continue
selling IBM compatibles, but all of the manufacturers will
need to improve their production and pricing policies in
order to compete with IBM. IBM promised to keep their price
differential between ten and fifteen percent. Recall that
price differentials for the other firms ranged from 25 to
300 percent. Mexico hopes that IBM's presence will actually
induce some "constructive competition" into the Mexican
computer industry, but it remains to be seen.
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During the Mexico-IBM negotiation, industry observers
viewed it as a test case for Mexico's ability to prove its
liberalization intentions. The test case analogy can be
drawn here as well for proving the ability of developing
country states to enhance and exercise sources of bargaining
strength. Mexico has signalled that it has recognized
possible sources of bargaining strength and has improved its
ability to exercise them during TNC negotiations. At the
s'ame time. Mexico did not take full advantage of these
sources of bargaining strength.
Because, traditionally, TNCs are more powerful, and
because of the overall decline in new foreign investment,
Mexico and other developing countries have strong incentives
to improve their bargaining skills and strategies for
foreign investment negotiations. Clearly these states want
to gain more favorable terms from the foreign investment
agreements since these agreements have broad implications
for industrial and economic development in the country. In
other words, improving negotiating skills means meeting
development objectives.
One aspect of improving negotiating skills is the
ability to more effectively take advantage of sources of
bargaining strength. One practical model for
industrializing countries to achieve this goal is to
establish an Industrial Development Authority.E9] The
Industrial Development Authority can set up offices around
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the world--in the United States, Europe, and Asia--and
regionally within the country, if necessary, with relatively
few staff people per office. This model requires extremely
good organizational skills and availability of experienced
managers, but the strategy can be implemented slowly over
time. Countries like Mexico, Venezuela, Colombia, Nigeria,
India, and Brazil ("assertive upper tier countries") do not
seriously lack educated people to staff such an endeavor.
The goal is to promote the state's investment opportunities
on the investor's turf, gain access to more global resources
and expertise, and therefore, increase its flexibility and
its potential disadvantaqe vis-a-vis the TNC.
The Industrial Development Authority would be
established to:
o Promote and market the country's interests and
resources around the world and develop rational
incentive packages to enhance its attractiveness to
potential investors.
o Research, gather, and share information about the
needs and interests of business enterprises and
develop methods and strategies to meet those needs in
the context of its own national development priorities.
o Better understand its competitive position among
countries and also develop strategies to improve its
competitive advantage as well as induce and maintain a
competitive environment among potential or existing
investors.
o Streamline and coordinate decision-making,
negotiating, and implementing in the government with
respect to foreign investment so that a wide policy
perspective is maintained and expertise about foreign
investment grows.
Within this model, I recommend some specific
strategies for states to keep in mind during foreign
investment negotiations. No single strategy can stand on
its own; the state should work toward implementing all these
strategies with sensitivity to the inevitable differences
that will occur from one negotiation to the next.
(1) Plan for negotiation by clearly identifying those
resources that the country has to offer, i.e.., cheap labor,
land, markets. Also identify the state's development
objectives and industry and firm-specific needs and
interests. From this, incentive packages can be developed
that will promote investment to serve the interests of the
state, the domestic and international industry, and the
firm. Tax breaks, grant programs, or special investment
assistance (such as site selection or administrative
liaisons) are some components of an incentive package.
(2) Emphasize post-investment assistance in order to
build a good relationship with the firm. This will also
enable the state to maintain greater control over the
investment since it has a hand in developing the
enterprise over time.
(3) Lengthen the time horizon of the negotiation in
order to create the anticipation of a future relationship.
Emphasize during a negotiation that agreement may depend
upon the future expansion or other plans of the firm. Many
investors, particularly those engaged in a joint venture,
have short-term profit horizons. The state need not take
this as given, but should induce the investors to discuss
their long-term plans to motivate the parties to consider a
long-term relationship.
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(4) Make use of diplomatic ties and establish networks
with other developing countries that have negotiated
agreements with the particular firm in question or that are
also developing a particular industry. Information-sharing
directly or through an agency like the United Nations Centre
on Transnational Corporations can be a source of strength.
(5) Effectively taking advantage of the role of
competition involves both offensive and defensive
strategies. Making the country's investment environment
more attractive with streamlined processes, incentive
packages, and a reputation for good relationships over time
is a way to maintain a competitive lead among countries.
Inducing competition among potential investors is more
difficultq but if the state has identified its attractive
resources it can establish a policy of competitive bidding
for investment opportunities. Another possible method for
maintaining a competitive environment may be to require a
search for alternative investors or outside expert opinions
on company proposals presented to the government
authorities. This recommendation can apply for both
potential investors and established firms. The state must
not forget that established firms are a resource for
inducing competition. Established investors can be played
off potential investors and vice versa.
(6) The state may be able to play entrepreneur or
venture capitalist itself by establishing state industries
or providing grants to local industrialists in order to
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create more alternatives to choose from.
(7) By organizing foreign investment policy,
objectives, and practices in an Industrial Development
Authority, the country can coordinate its efforts. The
Board of Directors ought to represent the interests of the
various ministries (i.e., along the lines of Mexico's
Foreign Investment Commission) in order to allow for a wide
policy perspective and avoid interministerial infighting.
(8) Plan for appropriate public exposure of the
negotiations. Make sure that announcements and press
releases are agreed upon by all the parties involved
beforehand and that the information released is accurate.
(9) Plan for the appropriate decision-makers to be
present during the negotiations. Match the level of
negotiator sent to the negotiation to the level of
negotiator that the foreign firm sends. For example,
in the first round, exchanging information, defining the
issues, and evaluating the technical components of the
proposal can be achieved by sending lower tier officials or
staff. These participants will be responsible for briefing
the decision-makers of the agenda and technical issues.
Later, when the agenda is set and decisions need to be made,
those actually responsible for the decisions about the
investment should join the negotiating table. It is
important to keep those who will ultimately implement the
decision or have technical expertise on the issues
continually involved to ease implementation efforts later
on. By having a consistent policy of how and by whom
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decisions will be made, appropriate delagating--rather than
circumventing--of authority is ensured.
Recent evidence suggests that developing countries are
increasingly able to improve their bargaining power vis-a-
vis TNCs. Where Mexico's record in bargaining encounters
was poor, its recent efforts have been relatively more
successful as the IBM in Mexico case suggests. Placing
state-TNC bargaining in the context of negotiation
principles and practice can add to the sophistication and
wisdom of foreign investment interactions and agreements.
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Notes to Conclusion:
[1] New York Times, February 16, 1986; Quarterly Economic
Review, (1985, No.3).
[2) Wall Street Journal, January 21, 1985, page 27.
[3) See Part I notes [453 and [46).
[4) Jim Austin, taped interview of Mario Espinoza de los
Reyes, (October 1985).
[5) Jim Austin, taped interview of Mario Espinoza de los
Reyes, (October 1985).
[6) Interview, Allen Krause, (Spring 1986).
[7) Business Latin America, (August 21, 1985); Tim Berry,
(July 1985), pages 27-31.
[8) Business Latin America, (August 21, 1985).
[93 Ireland, a poor country with no existing or potential
local market, has actively and successfully promoted
industrial development through IDA Ireland, their
Industrial Development Authority. (Ireland's largest
selling point is their 10 percent corporate tax rate
and an English-speaking, educated work force.) IDA
Ireland provides the basis for an industrial
development organization model for developing
countries.
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APPENDI X:
Exhibits 1 and 2
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Exhibit I: Mexico's Foreign Investment Law: Chapter III
The National Commission on Foreign Investment
Article 11. The National Commission on Foreign Investment is hereby created and shall be composed of the Ministries of
the Interior (Gobernacion), Foreign Affairs, Finance and Public Credit, National Resources (now Patrimonio y Fosento
Industrial), Industry and Commerce, Labor and Social Welfare and the Presidency. [Mines and Programming and Budget is
also included.) The Deputy Ministers appointed by each Minister shall act as alternate members.
Meetings shall be chaired in rotating order, according to the precedence established in the above paragraph, by the
Minister present. The commission shall meet at least once a month.
The Commission shall be assisted by an Executive Scretary appointed by the President of the Republic.
Article 12. The National Commission on Foreign Investment shall have the following powers:
1. To decide, in accordance with Article 5 of this law, the increase or reduction of the percentage of the foreign
investment share in the country's different geographical areas or economic activities, when there are no legal
provisions or regulations that establish a given percentage or set the conditions under which such investment may be
received;
2. To decide the percentages and conditions in which foreign investment shall be accepted in specific cases where,
because of exceptional circumstances, special treatment is called for;
3. To decide on proposed foreign investment in business enterprises established, or to be established, in Mexico, or in
new business enterprises;
4. To decide on the participation of foreign investment existing in Mexico in new fields of economic activity or in new
production lines;
5. To act as an entity of mandatory consulation on foreign investment matters for agencies, enterprises with government
participation, trust institutions for trusts set up by the Federal Government or state governments, and the National
Securities Commission;
6. To establish the criteria and requirements for application of legal provisions and regulations regarding foreign
investment;
7. To coordinate the action of Executive Branch agencies, decentralized agencies, and enterprises with government
participation in exercizing their powers with respect to foreign investment;
8. To submit, for the consideration of the Executive Branch, legislative and regulatory projects and administrative
measures in the matter of foreign investment; and
9. Other powers granted by this law.
Article 13. In order to determine the advisability of authorizing foreign investment and to establish the percentages
and conditions by which it shall be governed, the commission shall take into account the following criteria and
characteristics of the investment:
1. That it should be complementary to national investment;
2. That it should not displace national business enterprises that are operating satisfactorily, and that it should not
enter fields that are adequately covered by such enterprises.
3. Its positive effects on the balance of payments and, especially, on the increase of Mexican exports;
4. Its effect on employment, taking into account job opportunities created and wages paid;
5. The employment and training of Mexican technical and management personnel;
6. The incorporation of domestic inputs and components in the manufacture of its products;
7. The extent to which it finances its operations with resources from abroad;
8. The diversification of sources of investment and the need to foster Latin American regional and subregional
integration;
9. Its contiribution to the development of the relatively less economically developed zones or regions;
10. That it should not enjoy nosopolistic positions in the domestic market;
11. The capital structure of the branch of economic activity involved;
12. Its contribution of technology and its assistance in the country's technological research and development;
13. Its effect on price levels and quality of production;
14. That it should respect the country's social and cultural values;
15. The importance of the activity in question in the context of the country's economy;
16. The extent to which the foreign investor is identified with the country's interest and his connection with foreign
centers of economic decision; and
17. In general, the extent to which it complies with, and contributes to, the achievement of national development
policy objectives.
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EXHIBIT 2: The Mexican Computer Plan
[Source: Data Services in Latin America and the Caribbean, UNCTC (September 26, 1985))
This is the Mexican Computer Plan as of early 1984 (after the government announced its intentions to take a more open
view toward foreign investment).
STATED OBJECTIVES:
(1) to develop a local manufacturing sector to supply both national and international markets;
(2) to strengthen the Mexican economy by diminshing the negative impact of computer imports on the balance of payments;
(3) to favour greater technological independence.
BASIC REQUIREMENTS AND INCENTIVES:
(1) RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT:
R & D centres of both government and private firms which are developing new products must be recorded in the
National Registry of Scientific and Technological Institutions. Overall R&D expenditure will be monitored by the
Secretariat of National Wealth and Industrial Development. Moreover, R&D expenditures must be invested in
specifically defined activities.
(2) TAX CREDITS ARE ALLOWED EQUIVALENT TO:
o 20% of the amount of investment in the installation or expansion of production capacity;
o 20% of the number of jobs generated directly by the investment or of additional jobs due to the installation
of new shifts;
o 15% of the value of purchased components manufactured in Mexico;
o 15% of purchase price of computer equipment bought from firms registered in the National Computer Plan;
o 15X of value of nationally manufactured components provided the supplier is registered under the Plan;
o (negotiable percentage) for local R&D divisions developed to foster a national market.
(3) EXPORT/IMPORT RATIO REQUIREMENTS:
Microcomputers: 25% in the second year; 70. by fifth year.
Firms not complying with these regulations face a possible cutback in import permits.
(4) LOCAL CONTENT REQUIREMENTS:
Microcomputers: at least 35 in first year; 45% by third year.
The Secretariat is given the authority to establish annual import quotas of computer systems and equipment
applicable to the manufacturers and distributors who are registered. It is expected that import quotas will
decrease within five years and become a "minimal part of the national supply of computer systems and equipment.'
(5) DIFFERENTIATION BETWEEN EXISTING MANUFACTURERS AND NEW COMPANIES:
o New companies must be 'Mexicanized" with 51% national capital.
o Existing companies with majority foreign ownership are grandfathered into the Plan and are not affected.
These companies, when registered with the Plan, may only receive incentives if their manufacturing operations
are exclusively in the areas of mini and macro computer systems.
o New companies, in order to receive the incentives outlined in the Plan, may be required to locate their
manufacturing facilities in specified geographic zones established in the Incentive Program. (Decentralization
effort).
o Companies must promise to manufacture in Mexico products which have the most advanced technology and invest in
R&D as well as marketing of their products through their own retail outlets.
o Companies must promise to manufacture their products in accordance with Mexican quality standards. In the
absence of particular Mexican standards, companies are required to abide by applicable international
standards.
o Companies are required to file a production schedule covering a minimum period of three years. Production
levels must be maintained or increased.
o Companies are required to present a schedule which outlines the creation of new jobs over a period of three
(3) years. The company must also promise to generate the jobs necessary to meet its detailed production
program.
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